Two key issues are examined in an integrated framework: the emergence of global imbalances and the precautionary motive for accumulating reserves. Standard models of general equilibrium would predict modest current account surpluses in the emerging markets if they face higher risk than the US itself. But, with pronounced Loss Aversion in emerging markets, their precautionary savings can generate substantial 'global imbalances', especially if there is an inefficient supply of global 'insurance'. A combination of fear and market failure generates imbalances as a general equilibrium outcome. In principle, lower real interest rates will ensure aggregate demand equals supply at a global level: but disequilibrium may result if the required real interest rate is negative.
FEAR AND MARKET FAILURE: GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND "SELF-INSURANCE"

Non Technical Summary
Are the present current account imbalances -including notably a US external deficit now running at 7% of its national output -part of the normal ebb and flow of trade and finance; or are there special factors at work? Is laissez faire the appropriate policy or is there a case for policy coordination? It depends who you ask.
According to Nouriel Roubini, looking for factors to account for current global imbalances is rather like solving a 'whodunnit': and the two most plausible culprits turn out to be the US and Asia. A very different perspective is offered by David Backus and co-authors, however.
They bridle at the use of the term global imbalances; and by the same token they reject the idea of looking for special factors or 'culprits' associated with them. What we observe, they suggest, is business-as-usual: for this no special explanation (nor any policy initiatives) are required.
To investigate how plausible it is that standard optimising behaviour explains what we observe -and, if not, what special factors need to be introduced -we employ a simple global model of trade and finance which incorporates elements of higher risk faced in emerging markets.
What we find is that an orthodox general equilibrium approach fails to produce significant imbalances, in part because of assuming that efficient competitive asset markets spread risk globally. To this extent, we must part company from Backus and co-authors. But things change when we go further to introduce unorthodox features into the model: then, the general equilibrium approach does produce imbalances.
What are these factors? We refer to them in summary fashion as fear and market failure. The former refers to the scarring effects that the East Asia crisis has had on countries in the region; for which the concept of Loss Aversion is introduced in modelling aggregate demand by emerging markets. The latter refers to the absence of efficient means to spread the risk.
Even when countries are profoundly loss averse -determined to avoid the downside consumption shocks of the recent past -we find that efficient asset markets can, in principle, provide the necessary assurance without a savings glut. It is when appropriate insurance is not available that fearful consumers self-insure through saving, and global imbalances begin to emerge. Our approach is one in which we integrate the precautionary motive for accumulating reserves into a model of global imbalances.
Joseph Stiglitz remarks that "The East Asian countries that constitute the class of '97 -the countries that learned the lessons of instability the hard way in the crises that began in that year -have boosted their reserves in part because they wanted to make sure that they won't need to borrow from the IMF again. Others, who saw their neighbours suffer, came to the same conclusion -it is imperative to have enough reserves to withstand the worst of the world's economic vicissitudes." A combination of fear and market failure generates this scenario as a general equilibrium outcome.
The effect of precautionary behaviour in depressing real interest rates (and possibly employment) is, however, checked by the US acting as 'consumer-of-last-resort'. But there are risks for the global economy. In the immediate short run, interest rates might hit a floor -the so-called Liquidity Trap -where the consumer of last resort fails to match precautionary savings, and global demand falls below supply. This is especially true if those outside the US are no longer willing to accumulate US debt and the US is faced with a 'Sudden Stop' in its deficit financing
Over the longer run, we have effectively assumed that demand in Emerging Markets will rise strongly when adequate reserve levels have been achieved. But this may well be excessively optimistic -posing similar issues of adjusting demand in the longer term. The simplifying assumption of only one good conceals the need for exchange rate changes to accompany this adjustment -as described by Obstfeld and Rogoff -and the need to avoid exchange rate "overshooting" along the way.
Introduction
Current forecasts of global growth may be benign, but they pose interesting puzzles.
If growth is expected to proceed at a healthy rate, why are real interest rates so low (Greenspan's conundrum)? If the current account US deficit proves unsustainable, how is it to adjust? Will this be assisted by policy coordination 3 , as for the dollar in the 1980s: or can it be left to market forces? Before developing a simple global model to show how low real interest rates around the world and high savings outside the USA may be explained by attitudes towards risk, we briefly outline some influential but contrasting views currently in circulation 4 .
Bretton Woods 2; 'Charles River' reactions; and 'Dark matter'
To understand current events some argue that one needs to look back fifty years to the creation of the Bretton Woods system of fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates.
Then, after WW II was over, the major economies of Europe pegged against the US dollar at exchange rates low enough to permit export-led recovery and a reconstitution of reserves. Now, in the 21 st century, it is not recovery from war but emergence from relative poverty that dictates the choice of regime; and the currency that is effectively pegged against the dollar is the Chinese remnimbi in what Dooley et al. (2004) call a revived Bretton Woods (hereafter BW2).
In their eyes, a policy of export-led growth, giving jobs to the millions who are leaving the land to seek jobs in manufacturing, makes good sense for China, now and for some time to come. And China is willing to hold the US securities that are financing the counterpart US deficits, a ready store of liquidity available to head off virulent financial panic of the type that swept East Asia in 1997/8. (If that was like bank run, as Jeffrey Sachs suggested at the time, China is now enabled to act as a regional lender-of-last-resort, and it is in fact party to regional swap arrangements to boost confidence, Kohlscheen and Taylor, 2006) .
Support for the viability of BW2 has been provided by Richard Cooper of Harvard University, a close observer of the Chinese scene, who argues that the investing domestic savings in dollars makes good sense for a country plagued with insecurity 3 As argued recently by the Governor of the Bank of England (King, 2006) . 4 A more comprehensive list is to be found in Roubini (2006 Conditional on the existence of such capital market constraints, the constellation of low real rates and 'global imbalances' is an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea that agents whose budget constraints reflect current income rather than expected future flows will restrict their consumption accordingly may sound rather Keynesian; but, on their analysis, the restriction leads to lower interest rates not unemployment.
Rather than shackles that may hobble Asian economies, Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005) appeal to the quasi-monopoly power of the US to explain the viability of the current regime
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. The country may be running deficits as conventionally measured, but this is offset, they argue, by the acquisition of assets that are improperly accounted for. The missing elements, so-called dark matter, reflect quasirents in three areas: in the issuance of money in the form of dollar bills (seigniorage);
in the provision of secure assets for a risky world; and in the supply of entrepreneurial know-how (adding 'goodwill' to US FDI).
The Transfer Problem; the Peso Problem; and the Risk of Recession
The sanguine view of a revived and relatively durable BW2 has been subjected to persistent and detailed criticism from academics, market watchers and think tanks, many located in the US itself. What then of those who see cracks in the edifice, signs of the demise of a regime created by peradventure and sustained by US deficits which would merit severe downgrades for any other sovereign borrower? Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) , for example, judge the pattern of global imbalances to be unsustainable. To calibrate the adjustments needed to correct for this they appeal to an earlier historical episode -the transfer of resources from Germany to the Allies after WWI. Since the US is absorbing more than it produces (pace Hausmann and Sturzenegger), this will have shifted the real exchange rate, with the terms of trade moving in favour of US exports and the price of non-traded goods in the US rising relative to foreign counterparts. As and when the US curbs its absorption, the real exchange rate must adjust to reflect the shift of global demand. This may require a thirty percent devaluation of the dollar (a weighted average of a 10% shift in the terms of trade and 40% shift in the relative price of non-traded goods, very approximately).
Their timely treatment is, however, subject to two criticisms. First, the model is static so it has little to say about the global interest rates. It is an account of general equilibrium in a global endowment economy, with inter-temporal issues left to one side: the US deficit continues until, at some unspecified date, capital markets cry halt and the dollar falls to secure the appropriate reallocation of consumption. Second, in the process of adjustment it is assumed that national income constraints mimic those of a "transfer" problem; but it is far from clear why unilateral action by the US to reduce absorption will lead to expanded absorption elsewhere, especially if the trigger for the US adjustment is a Sudden Stop in capital flows to the world's largest economy.
Assuming that the end of BW2 will involve a significant dollar devaluation, this should 
External Imbalances and Irving Fisher
Irving Fisher viewed savings and investment decisions from the perspective of optimising consumption over time 10 : and applying this perspective to countries involved in international trade has led to the now-popular inter-temporal approach to the balance of payments. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 1) express it, "Much of the macroeconomic action in an open economy is connected with its intertemporal trade, which is measured by the current account of the balance of payments".
Before introducing our general equilibrium approach, which includes risk as well, we sketch three variants of the neo-Fisherian perspective that bear on the current debate. First that current account imbalances may reflect international differences in growth rates, as suggested by Backus et al. (2006) ; second that, with no growth differentials, imbalances may reflect capital market constraints, as in Caballero et al. (2005) ; a third, closely-related possibility is that behaviour may be reflecting insecure 10 As, in a full employment context, did Keynes and Ramsey (1928) .
property rights in the EM, the Cooper hypothesis. These can be illustrated simply as in Figure 1 . Next assume by contrast that both countries have identical endowments at point A.
While the US consumes with the appropriate inter-temporal budget constraint, let the EM be constrained to lower budget line passing through A' as might be the case if capital markets fail to take due account of future endowments. The consumption and savings in period 1 will be precisely the same as for the case of growth differentials.
Could this represent the capital-constrained perspective of Caballero et al? (Probably not, because it would not be sensible for the EM to save knowing that it is about to receive the same endowment as the US!)
But what if consumers in the EM are not sure that they will secure the extra outputbecause of ill-defined property rights, as Cooper says is true in China? Then they might act 'as if' their expectations of the growth in the EM were unduly pessimisticas if they expected output in EM to be stationary, for example. In which case, despite the fact that both countries have identical endowments at point A, insecure ownership might lead to the same high savings in EM and low global interest rates as predicted Backus et al.
These inter-temporal accounts are essentially deterministic: would a stochastic specification have something more to offer? This is what we explore next, first with standard (logarithmic) preferences and then with the introduction of loss aversion.
With the addition of market failure, we find that loss aversion generates a constrained equilibrium rather similar to that of Cabbellero et al. and Cooper.
General Equilibrium with Complete Markets
To incorporate risk, we use a simplified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in the tradition of Mas-Colell et al (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) . This stylised one good model has two time periods, two states of nature and two countries -the US and EM; and we use the asterisk suffix '*' to denote EM. The framework is similar to that used earlier to study global finance and the US New Economy in Miller et al (2005 Miller et al ( , 2006 , though the endowment pattern reflects the traditional situation where the US invests in risky assets and supplies safety and security in exchange (Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005) .
Rather than postulating growth differentials, with low growth for the EM accounting for low world real interest rates and large US deficits, we assume identical expected growth but differential risk. Specifically growth prospects in EM have greater volatility than for the US, modelled by adding a mean-preserving spread. Though this does not have a great impact in a standard general equilibrium framework, results change when downside risk is aggravated by a form of Loss Aversion. (The utility of consumption in period 2 which lies below that reached in the previous period is sharply discounted.) In a stochastic environment, the resulting risk sensitivity can lead the EM to acquire substantial insurance; and to act 'as if' it underestimates the mathematical expectation of growth.
When the relevant insurance is not available (or the provision is not credible), the EM can always 'self-insure' -saving instead of swapping financial promises. So the desire to limit downside risk can make the EM act 'as if' it has very low time preference as we show in numerical outcomes below. Combining inadequate insurance with Loss Aversion provides a ready explanation for low interest rates, the US deficit and high EM savings.
To put If there is concern that consumption on the downside should not fall relative to past levels, China can of course seek insurance by selling FDI and buying US government bonds: and it can also seek to self-insure by acquiring US bonds via the current account. If, for any reason, the first option is limited, then self-insurance will be seen as the only way to avoid an unappealing prospect -the prospect, perhaps, of humiliation like that suffered by its near neighbour South Korea in 1997/1998 when it had to go cap in hand to the IMF and G7 and sacrifice sovereignty to get the financial support it needed in the crisis.
12 11 when, in the crisis, trend growth rates effectively changed sign. 12 Stiglitz (2006, p248) comments "The East Asian countries that constitute the class of '97 -the countries that learned the lessons of instability the hard way in the crises that began in that year -have boosted their reserves in part because they wanted to make sure that they won't need to borrow from the IMF again. Others, who saw their neighbours suffer, came to the same conclusion -it is imperative to have enough reserves to withstand the worst of the world's economic vicissitudes."
These considerations may suggest that strategic factors play a role that is not captured in the competitive framework we use here
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-that some sort of insurance market game may be in process. This is discussed briefly in section 4 below.
The Benchmark Case
The pattern of endowments assumed is indicated in Table 2 . Both blocs are endowed with one unit at time one. In expected terms each bloc grows at the rate g , say three
percent. In the absence of uncertainty each bloc would consume its endowment and, with log utility, real interest rates would equal growth rate plus the pure rate of time preference. If the latter were, say, 1.5 percent, this would imply the global real interest rates of 4.5%. To study the pattern of savings and world real interest rates, we first present benchmark results where the complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities can be traded.
Later we look at how these results may change if the set of securities is restricted or preferences modified. To simplify the exposition of the benchmark results, we assume representative consumers in both countries share identical preferences. Home country's lifetime utility is given by
where β is time preference, 1 C and ) ( 2 ⋅ C are period 1 and period 2 consumption respectively. The budget constraint of US is given by
) are Arrow prices measured in period 1 sure consumption, and W is the present value of US's total wealth. Given Arrow prices, US's optimal consumption implied by its first order conditions are
Those for EM follow the same forms.
Applying equilibrium conditions, that total consumption in each period and state equals the corresponding total endowment, determines the equilibrium Arrow prices and real interest rates as follows:
where superscript W indicates world endowment. The pattern of consumption is obtained by substituting (6) and (7) into (3), (4) and (5).
With the endowments specified in Table 2 , EM has an incentive to save in period 1. This is evident from a comparison of EM wealth relative to US wealth. Note that
where σ is the standard deviation of the EM endowment and
Because EM wealth is relatively lower, so is consumption, i.e.
. So EM saves, matched by a US current account deficit. Clearly the more volatile is EM's endowment is in period 2 (i.e. the greater is σ ), the higher will be its period 1 savings. But with log utility and efficient provision of 'insurance', the savings effects are distinctly modest, as will be seen in Table 3 . How securities markets provide this insurance is indicated graphically in Figure 2 , an Edgeworth box diagram as in Mas-Colell et al (p.593, 1995) describing allocations in period 2. Outcomes for the high payoff state are on the horizontal and for the low payoff state on the vertical, and utility for the EM is measured from the lower left corner and that for US from the upper right. Identical probability assessments and utility functions imply that the contract curve is the diagonal in the figure. 14 The autarky endowment point is at A, where for the US -identical endowments in both states -this lies on the 45-degree line measured from the upper right corner. For the EM, however, disparity in the endowment between the two states means that it lies to the right of the 45-degree line drawn from the bottom left corner. Ignoring the effect of the first period savings on reallocating entitlements (as they are so small, see Table   3 ), general equilibrium consumption is shown at point E (on the contract curve). Table 3 . US deficits and the world real interest rates: 4 cases.
Note: LA refers to Loss Aversion. US deficits are measured as percentage of period 1 GDP. All simulations assume equi-probable states; but, for the case of LA and bonds only, the results are in fact independent of state probabilities.
From lines 2 and 3 for the Benchmark case in Table 3 , it is evident that stochastic endowments for the EM do lead to some lowering of world interest rates and some increase in the US deficit as the theory predicts: but with log preferences the quantitative effects are very small. Increasing the standard deviation from 3% to 12%, for example, only increases the US deficit by one fifth of a percentage point of GDP; and it shaves a mere 30 basis points off the world interest rate. 
Equilibrium with no "insurance"
What if the only asset traded between the two countries is a bond which has the same payoff in both states in period 2? In the absence of insurance possibilities, the EM will save more in period 1 to avoid potential utility losses were it to consume its unequal endowments in period 2, and the extra savings will bring down the global rate of interest. This can be shown as follows.
Denote S the first period saving by US (the amount of bonds purchased), its optimal level is determined by the solution to the following problem:
where ) 1 ( r + is the gross real interest rates. Table 3. EM saving as percentage of GDP (and the US deficit) is twice as large as in the Benchmark case, but it still remains very small even when standard deviation of the shock to its endowment rises to 12%. With log utility, therefore, eliminating insurance does not predict a savings glut in the EM. (The effect of increasing risk on the world interest rate is more pronounced: it falls by 60 basis points, to less than 4%, when the standard deviation increases from 3 to 12%.)
Global Equilibrium with Loss Aversion
Loss aversion with a complete set of Arrow securities
In this section, we modify the preferences of the EM by incorporating two elements from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): namely, reference dependence and loss aversion. We assume that consumption achieved in the previous period acts as a reference in the current period, so the measurement of utility depends on whether there is a "loss" or a "gain" in current consumption relative to this reference. To capture loss aversion, we assume that, close to the reference point, the increase in utility of a unit "gain" in current consumption (relative to the reference) is much smaller than the decrease in utility of a unit "loss" in current consumption.
Specifically, let the utility of state i consumption be defined as (11) is equivalent to imposing the constraint that
The procedure used here, of imposing the constraint that next period's consumption in any state of the world should not fall below consumption in the current period, could also be viewed as an extreme form of habit formation as widely used in macroeconomic models. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) , in their attempts to determine whether sticky prices can lead to volatile and persistent real exchange rate movements, for example, assume in one experiment that the utility from consumption depends not on current consumption but its level relative to a fraction of last period's aggregate consumption. A similar formulation has also been used by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) , Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe ( In what follows, we show that loss aversion can also increase savings, but only if consumption would otherwise have fallen below the reference trigger. With complete contingent securities, US optimal consumption is derived in the same way as in Section 2.1. But EM's optimal consumptions are solutions to the following problem:
subject to the budget constraint
and (12).
How does loss aversion in EM change the equilibrium prices and allocation? We summarise these results in the following propositions. Note that with complete Arrow securities, both countries can share risks. This risksharing means that both countries consume more or less equal proportions of the aggregate state endowment. So if the standard deviation of EM endowment in period 2 is small, EM is effectively insured against low consumption in the bad state.
Therefore, no additional saving is required. Y C = , the loss aversion constraint is not binding; and equilibrium in Figure 4a is identical to that in Figure 3 . When risk increases, however, equilibrium can change as indicated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For the endowment structure given in Table 2 , if 2g σ > , then ) and to make it more forward-looking (
How loss aversion can impact on global equilibrium is illustrated using Figure 4b fallen and pessimism has increased in EM.
As indicated in Proposition 3, this new equilibrium may also be replicated without loss aversion if EM has lower time preference (higher β ) and greater pessimism (lower π ). As can be seen in Figure 4b , the increase in pessimism in the EM, calibrated by a fall in π π / ' , has two effects: first it makes the contract curve concave, and second it changes the relative Arrow prices which makes EM's budget constraint flatter. The decrease in the time preference, calibrated by the increase in β β / ' , has the effect of increasing EM's savings and so shifting its second period effective endowments from A to B. The intersection of the budget constraint BE' with the modified contract curve defines the equilibrium.
The quantitative significance of loss aversion on real interest rates and savings is indicated in lines 6 and 7 for the third case considered in Table 3 . With the standard deviation of up to 6%, the constraint is not binding, so the real interest rates and savings are the same as in the benchmark case. But the effect of loss aversion becomes apparent when the standard deviation increases to 12%: this generates a substantial increase in the EM savings and a marked fall in the global interest rates.
As a consequence, the US deficit rises by 1% of GDP as a 0.7% fall of the real interest rates encourages US consumption. Table 4 . Loss aversion, less time preferences and more pessimism.
Loss aversion with incomplete markets
Results in the section above show how loss aversion can significantly increase savings and reduce the world interest rate, even though both countries share risk in the second period. But global financial markets are notoriously incomplete, as emphasised by Wolf (2005) 
where
The consumption allocation for EM is given by (2) C C ≥ , so real interest rates and consumption allocation in Section 3.2 still constitute the equilibrium solution.
For g σ > , however, solutions in Section 3.2 violate the constraint
Imposing binding constraint yields the optimal consumption for EM as in (15) and (16). The optimal consumption for US, derived in the same way as in Section 3.2, Replacing the real interest rates in one of the equations using the other gives the US offer curve. How is the world interest rate to be determined? For markets to clear in period 1, the real interest rate has to fall sufficiently so that extra consumption by the US balances precautionary savings by the emerging markets. In Martin Wolf's words, the US has to act as the global 'consumer of last resort' (Wolf, 2006) . Diagrammatically, the real interest rate must be chosen such that vector of excess consumption AA' is equal and opposite to the precautionary savings vector LL', as in Figure 6 . It is clear from the figure that an increase in σ would result in an increase in the EM's savings. To ensure that this is matched by the US deficit, the budget line AA' has to rotate anticlock-wise, reducing real interest rates.
Three observations are clear from the Figure. First, that as L' is on a budget line which lies below the usual Fisherian inter-temporal budget constraint, loss aversion can apparently generate outcomes observationally equivalent to the lack of capitalisation postulated by Caballero et al (2006) and the contrarian view of Cooper (2005) .
The second that the predictions for savings and global interest rates in period 1 do not depend on the state probabilities. Figure 6 illustrates the global equilibrium for the case where high and low states are equi-probable: so the US trading vector AA' is balanced by the equally weighted EM's trading vectors LL' and HH'. Consequently, when high state is realised in period 2, this model predicts a massive increase in the EM's state consumption (given by point H'). But this unrealistic prediction can easily be modified without changing savings behaviour. Consider for example, the case of asymmetric shocks where there is low probability of a large negative shock and a high probability of a small positive shock, see Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) .
To keep the mean-preserving feature of the EM's second period state endowments,
, where H σ is the shock in the high state and L σ that in the low state. By fixing L σ at the same level as that in Figure 6 , one can choose π close to 1 to make H σ arbitrarily small. This would yield the same equilibrium savings as drawn in Figure 6 , but reduce EM's high state consumption substantially. This is because savings and the interest rate do not depend on how likely the low state is but on how bad it is.
The third observation is that, given expectations of a large negative shock, equilibrium real interest rates can be negative. In terms of the figure, this will occur when the point A' on the US offer curve required to match these savings is sufficiently far to the right that the budget line has an absolute slope less than unity.
The algebraic condition for negative real rates is as follows:
Proposition 5. Given the endowment structure specified in Table 2 This is illustrated numerically in the last two lines of Table 3 , where for σ=12% savings reaches 4.6% and the equilibrium real interest rate fall to -4.3%
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.
The relationship between real interest rates and risk for parameters of our benchmark model is illustrated in more detail in Figure 7 where the horizontal axis measures the negative shock to EM's period 2 endowment and the equilibrium real interest rates is plotted on the vertical axis. When the loss aversion constraint is not binding real interest rates decrease very slowly with increasing σ; but when the loss aversion constraint is binding the real interest rates fall sharply as risk increases.
From Proposition 5, the critical level of σ beyond which the real interest turns negative turns out to be about 7.5% for the parameters used here. 
+4.6
-8.8 Table 4 . The effect of increasing risk (from benchmark of σ = 3 to σ=12)
Note: For Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) σ of 10% might lead to imbalances of about 5%.
Strategic considerations
All the calculations reported above assume competitive equilibrium even when the set of assets is incomplete. But, as Dooley and Garber (2005) Sturzenegger (2005), be the "dark matter" which allows the US to sustain substantial portfolio imbalance? Maybe so, but Meissner and Taylor warn that such monopoly power is a fading asset: the privilege is much higher in earlier years than later.
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Could one modify the competitive equilibrium by allowing for monopoly power on the part of the US? Instead of supplying safe asset on a competitive basis, US could, for example, select the utility maximising point on the demand for safe asset from the EM: or could it act as a dynamic monopolist? 18 As indicated by with results reported in a recent IMF study of the optimal reserves by Jeanne and Ranciere (2005) . For an emerging market economy facing a low spread in capital markets, the risk of a 10% fall in output should lead to reserve holdings of 9.37% of GDP, see discussion of Table 3 in their paper. Note that, as all these reserves will be used to maintain consumption when there is a shock and they are all reconstituted one period later, it is as if such a shock is associated with a corresponding savings rate of nine and a half percent of GDP over the post crisis period of reserve build up.
As there is no insurance in their model, this is to be compared with our bonds-only case, where the build-up of reserve assets precedes the crisis. For a shock with a downside of 12% our figure for savings is about four and a half percent. While this is only about half as much as for Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) , this may be because we allow for consumption smoothing across the two periods while their static simplification rules this out.
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Two observations may be made -over the period of time that reserves are built up, and over the implications for sustainability. As a preliminary, note that the actual reserve holdings by China greatly exceed the savings figures just discussed: from around 16% of GDP in 2000 they almost doubled to reach 29% in 2003, Jeanne and Ranciere (2006, 
The first order conditions become (6) and (7)). , the general equilibrium allocation will be the same as in Section 2.1.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the second case outlined above, namely, With (B15) and assumptions made in To show (5) in Proposition 2, note that from (B5), (B6), (4)- (7), one has * * 2 2 * * 2 2 (2, ) (2) 1 (1 ) (1) (2) / (1, ) 
